| Wastewater | Deer Island, Boston Harbor - Page 5 |
| Organized public protests |
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| For elected officials in 1938 doing nothing but studying the problem of pollution was not a good political position. This was especially true when citizens began to be blocked from going in the water at their neighborhood beaches on Boston Harbor and on the rivers and tributaries that fed into it. Facing increased public pressure, in 1938 the Legislature established another Special Commission, but this time placed elected rather than appointed officials in charge. Then instead of having the Engineers’ Report prepared by engineers employed by the state, they hired two nationally recognized consulting engineering firms, Greeley & Hansen and Metcalf & Eddy. |
| Also, before writing the report, the Commissioners did something that had seldom been done before, they held public hearings. For the 1936 report they had held one hearing at the State House, for the report published in 1939 they went on the road and held public hearings at town hall in Quincy and Winthrop. They must have been lively affairs, |
| “...In Quincy and Winthrop audiences taxed the capacity of the halls. It was necessary to transfer the meeting from the city hall to the high school auditorium in order to accommodate all interested in the pollution problem. |
| ...During the hearings, residents of the shoreline communities expressed alarm at conditions in Boston Harbor. They did not request - they demanded correction. |
| ...The Commission was repeatedly told that conditions in Boston Harbor are revolting to the esthetic sensibilities and violate all public health requirements.” |
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| In the cycle of environmental degradation followed by public outrage, public outrage was on the rise again. The Commissioners agreed that something had to be done, |
| “Our personal examination of waters in Boston Harbor and complaints registered by residents of the Metropolitan area, all substantiate previous reports of investigating bodies that pollution exists. We unequivocally state that conditions now existent in Boston Harbor and along the shores of the bay are sufficiently grave to make it mandatory that we recommend a definite program for alleviation of the objectionable conditions... As a result of our studies into conditions in the harbor, we find that experts and laymen recognize there is a serious pollution there.” |
| Written just three years after the 1936 report, the 1939 report sounded like it was describing a different harbor. Some of the Commissioners finding included, |
| “- That Boston Harbor, Quincy Bay, Hingham Bay and tidal estuaries are polluted. |
| - That streams tributary to Boston Harbor are polluted. That a potential health menace exists in these waters as a result of pollution. |
| - That the present, North and South Metropolitan Sewerage systems and the Boston Main Drainage System are inadequate. Sewage overflows into streams. Pollution results. |
| - That pollution curtails recreational expansion in Boston Harbor and its tributaries. “ |
| The Commissioners recommended spending $14.7 million ($273 million in 2020 dollars) for a whole series of storm overflow conduits along rivers north and west of Boston, and then $10 million ($186 million in 2020 dollars) for treatment plants at each of the three sewage outlets. Their hope was that at least 45 percent of the cost would be paid for by the federal government. The depression-era PWA (Public Work Administration) had provided funding for multiple sewage treatment plants throughout the country in the 1930s, but by the end of the decade the money was drying up. For Boston, the 1939 Commissioners report had only a recommendation to build the plants. If officials had acted on pollution in the harbor in 1930, it’s possible that there could have been sewage treatment plants in Boston, primarily paid for with federal funds, by the end of that decade. |
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| Maps from the 1939 Special Commision's report on sewage in Boston Harbor |
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| The consulting engineers, when describing the type of sewage treatment plant they were recommending, used the term partial treatment and not the more common term for the process, primary treatment. At its most basic, primary treatment is the separation of solids and liquid in the sewage. It is most typically done by means of sedimentation tanks where the solids settle to the bottom and are removed. Skimming of the tanks remove the oil, grease, and scum that float to the surface. The remaining liquid is either discharged directly or first chlorinated to kill bacteria and then discharged. The initial plan was only use chlorination during the summer months when people were more likely to be on or near the harbor. The authors dismissed using a more thorough process to purify sewage known as secondary treatment again trusting that, as earlier official had, |
| “…the great dilution possible in Boston Harbor… permits natural purification by oxidation of the organic matter makes a high degree of purification unnecessary.” |
| Plans for sewage treatment plant at Deer Island from the 1939 Special Commision report |
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| The initial plan for the solids, called sludge, was to pump it into tanks where it would be concentrated and then loaded onto a barge at disposed of at sea. The thinking of the Commission in 1939 was clear, |
| “…Boston has an easy and inexpensive method of sludge disposal available, that of barging the fresh solids to sea and dumping at a point far distant from shores. The operation cost (not including capital charges) of barging the sludge to sea would probably he only about one quarter the cost of de-watering and incineration. As fertilizer the sludge would he of such low quality and value that it would not be profitable to install the necessary work for its processing.” |
| What to do with the sludge would be a problem that would bedevil Boston for the next 50 years. |
| There was never going to be a single simple solution to cleaning up Boston Harbor. Earlier reports from Special Commissions had identified multiple problem areas including private drains at wharves, businesses, and industrial and manufacturing works discharging raw sewage into the harbor. Institutions on islands in the harbor were a problem, as were vessels visiting the harbor. New regulations and tighter enforcements would eventually address most of these problem areas. From the earliest reports the authors consistently identified two primary sources of pollution, polluted rivers feeding into the harbor, and the discharge at the three sewage system outlets. |
| The public outrage over the issue of pollution that spurred local action also resulting in action on a national level. As early as the late 1800’s an amended Federal Refuse Act gave the Army Corps of Engineers the regulatory authority to prevent the dumping of refuse into harbors, with the relevant important exception of liquid waste from municipal sanitary sewers. Further early federal actions would have limited impact with the states having most of the regulatory power. Though the federal government could impact local pollution control efforts by refusing or limiting funding requests. This happened in 1938 when the federal government denied the state’s funding request for a pumping station in East Boston because there was no treatment plant on Deer Island and as a result, the sewage would be pumped directly into Boston Harbor. In the years to come the federal government would bring to bear its power to require the states take steps to control pollution, and this would have a direct impact on Boston. |
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On the local level momentum was building at end of the 1930s to do something about pollution in Boston Harbor. The public was demanding it and the politicians obliged by crafting a bill in 1939, "Chap. 0512. An Act Making Additional Provisions For The Sewage Disposal Needs Of The North And South Metropolitan Districts And Other Communities," with five recommended construction projects, 1) a storm overflow conduit on the north side of the Charles River, 2) a storm overflow conduit on the south side of the Charles River, 3) a sewage treatment plant on Nut Island, 4) a sludge disposal solution including a boat, and 5) an extension of the North Metropolitan Relief Sewer from East Boston to Deer Island. Missing from the bill was money for sewage treatment plants at Deer Island and Moon Island. Total amount to be spent, the $10.4 million the Special Commission recommended. |
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It took about two years before all the details were worked out and a bill was passed by both legislative bodies and signed into law, “Chapter 720. An Act Further Providing For Sewage Disposal Needs Of The North And South Metropolitan Sewerage Districts.” The same projects, now with a price tag of $15 million were included (an earlier version of the bill did specify building a sewage treatment plant at Deer Island, but that was eliminated), again subject to a provision that federal money would be available, but now down to twenty-five percent of the total cost. The bill became law October 30, 1941. Less than 6 weeks later Pearl Harbor was bombed, and the United States entered World War II. Through the war years there were still reports of pollution, primarily regarding beaches being closed. But there would be no federal money available, and the projects was put on hold for the duration. |
| In mid-1945 with the war over in Europe, and reaching its conclusion in the Pacific, Massachusetts politicians again addressed the issue of pollution in Boston Harbor. "Chap. 0705. An Act Further Providing For Sewage Disposal Needs Of The North And South Metropolitan Sewerage Districts" again provided $15 million for the same almost the same five projects. New was a storm overflow conduit along the Alewife Brook. The disposal of sludge was now part of the proposed Nut Island project. The mention of a treatment plant at Deer Island was included, but only, “investigations, borings, designs, plans and specifications” as part of the North Metropolitan Relief tunnel. Funding for the projects now would likely be up to the state, with lawmakers expressing a hope that, “in case federal funds are federal assistance are made available.” Bids went out and in 1946 work commenced on construction of a sewage treatment plant for the South Metropolitan District on Nut Island in Quincy. |
| Initially there was support for the Deer Island portion of the project. In January of 1949 MDC Commissioner William T. Morrissey submitted his recommendations to the legislature for the year. In addition to a request to place a statue of Hamilton, Mass.-born World War II hero General George S. Patton, Jr., to be funded by gifts, on the Storrow Memorial Embankment, Morrissey asked for the funding for the North and South Metropolitan Sewage Districts projects be increased from $15 million to $40 million, $6 million dollars of which was for a sewage treatment plant at Deer Island. In July of that year the Massachusetts legislature approved the funding, including the Deer Island plant, with the caveat that only $5 million dollars could be spent per year. |
| Massachusetts legislators also took steps to end the discharge of raw sewage from Moon Island. While the MDC operated the North and South Metropolitan sewage systems, with their outlets at Nut Island and Deer Island, the original Boston Main Drainage sewage system, built in 1884 with its outlet at Moon Island, had remained the responsibility of the city. Quincy officials, fed up with raw sewage from the Moon Island facility washing up on Wollaston Beach, had successfully lobbied the legislature who obliged passing, "Chap. 0598. An Act To Provide For The Construction By The City Of Boston Of A Sewage Treatment Plant And Appurtenant Works." Passed three days before the MDC received approval to build a treatment plant at Deer Island, the law required that the city of Boston build a sewage treatment plant at Calf Pasture and have it finished by 1955. |
| Morrissey in his 1950 legislative recommendations looked to the same 1955 date as a target for the MDC to complete its projects, including a sewage treatment plant at Deer Island. To that end he requested that $12 million from the original $25 million authorization be approved in 1950. Of that request $2.5 million would be for a first stage of the Deer Island Treatment Plant (DITP). It’s not clear if Commissioner Morrissey knew when he submitted his request in January of the 1950 that negotiations were underway that would result in Boston not having to build a sewage treatment at Calf Pasture. |
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| Instead the City agreed to accept an MDC plan to construct a deep rock tunnel under Boston Harbor from South Boston to Deer Island and then use the yet-to-be-built sewage treatment plant there for both the Boston Main Drainage and North Metropolitan systems. Boston would not have to spend an estimated $10 million (over $100 million in 2019 dollars) to build a treatment plant at Calf Pasture and what had earlier been a remote area, today’s Columbia Point, was beginning to attract business development. Locating a large sewage plant there would make the area far less attractive. |
| Sensing the time might be right, MDC Commissioner Morrissey’s legislative recommendations for 1951 included a request for funding of eleven sewage projects. Progress towards ending pollution in the harbor was being made. The Nut Island sewage treatment plant was near completion. At a cost of $8 million it provided treatment for 30% of the sewage the metropolitan area produced. Digging had begun on a shaft in Chelsea for the North Metropolitan Relief Tunnel to Deer Island, planning was underway for the Boston Main Drainage Tunnel from South Boston to Deer Island, and engineering firms had hired to begin the design phase of a sewage treatment plant on Deer Island. The legislature obliged to Morrissey’s request authorizing an additional $25 million for a total, since 1949, of $65 million for metropolitan sewage projects, almost $650 million dollars today, setting a deadline of 1958 for completion of the projects. |
| Unknown to people at the time was that despite recent improvements being made, or at least planned, towards ending pollution in the harbor, the cycle towards environmental degradation and public outcry was about to begin again. The missed opportunity to fully address pollution of the harbor in the 1950s would underscore that the MDC was a poor vehicle to accomplish such an enormous task. |
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