| Wastewater | Deer Island, Boston Harbor - Page 7 |
| As early as the late 1800’s an amended Federal Refuse Act gave the Army Corps of Engineers the regulatory authority to prevent the dumping of refuse into harbors, with the relevant important exception of liquid waste from municipal sanitary sewers. Further early federal actions would have limited impact with the states having most of the regulatory power, though the federal government could impact local pollution control efforts by refusing or limiting funding requests. This happened in 1938 when the federal government denied the state’s funding request for a pumping station in East Boston because there was no sewage treatment plant on Deer Island. |
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In 1948 Harry S. Truman signed the Federal Water Pollution Act. It was the first major law enacted by Congress to address the problems of water pollution in the U.S. But its impact was limited because the states continued to have the primary responsibility to clean up any polluted waters. In 1965 Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine introduced the Water Quality Act. It required states to set water quality standards or have them set the federal government. Amended by House, the requirement was weakened giving states the rights to have the standards reviewed by a joint federal-state conference board. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the bill into law by the end of the year. In the following year, 1966, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration (FWPCA) under the Department of the Interior was created to set definitions for water quality. Massachusetts had been one of the first states in the country to established water quality standards at its Lawrence Experiment Station in the late 1800s. |
| While federal officials did not yet have enforcement authority, they were aware of Boston’s polluted waters. In 1966, when MDC officials were struggling to complete the DITP, the Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall paid a visit to Boston. In clearly a pre-arranged photograph, the Secretary is shown next to Senator Edward Kennedy dipping a cup into the polluted waters on the Charles River. The Boston Globe story quotes him as saying, “This is a big job to do… it won’t be easy.” Udall, chosen by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 for the cabinet post, was a dedicated conservationist and an early pioneer the environmental movement. |
| Working with the MDC, the FWPCA put out its first report on the water quality in Boston Harbor and its tributaries in the summer of 1967. While conducting a relatively limited survey, the report still concluded, “all reaches of the Harbor and each of its tributary streams, except for the inland marine reaches of the Weymouth Back and Weir Rivers, were polluted. About one-third of the Harbor’s area was grossly polluted.” Throughout the summer of 1967 the FWPCA continued to conduct research. In early 1968 it produced two reports with a summary of field data on water quality in the Charles River and Boston Harbor. First in January, Biological Aspects of water quality and in February, Chemical and Physical Aspects. The two studies provided the basis for the, Report on Pollution of the Navigable Waters of Boston Harbor, released in May 1968. |
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| Limited by laws that only allowed federal intervention to cases of pollution of waters that flowed between states, the FWPCA focused on the harm pollution in Boston Harbor was having to the shellfish industry, an interstate business. While it was an important issue, the maximum loss of the shellfish business was only a little over $1 million a year. The FWPCA effectively used the focus to force the MDC to confront pollution in the harbor. The report’s findings were likely not a surprise to anyone. The harvesting of shellfish throughout the harbor already had been either prohibited or severely restricted by state. Also, not a surprise would have been the identity of the sources of pollution or the degree of pollution that existed in the harbor. None of the findings were significantly different from investigations made more than 30 years earlier, nor were the recommendations. But for those local officials who understood the likelihood of the coming federal intervention in local pollution efforts, they knew they had a serious problem. The sewage treatment plant they had constructed on Deer at great expense did not incorporate a solution for what to do with the sludge it generated, and that would be a key focus of the federal government. From the report, |
| “The Federal Government has not granted funds to the MDC for construction of the Deer Island sewage treatment facility because of the MDC method used for the discharge of sludge.” |
| Local officials would prove to be correct in their understanding that the federal government was going to be playing a much more major role in efforts to clean up Boston Harbor. In 1968, the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was two years in the future, and it would be four years before the signing of the Clean Water Act. It provided federal officials with the authority to force Boston to clean up the harbor. |
| The Deer Island Treatment Plant was designed to handle an expected flow of 343 million gallons of sewage per day, with an anticipated maximum flow of 848 mgd during a storm. It was three times the size of Nut Island facility and one of the largest in the country. Wastewater reached the plant through the Boston Main Drainage tunnel from South Boston, the North Metropolitan Relief tunnel from Chelsea, and the original North Metropolitan Sewer running through Winthrop. Nine large pumps brought the wastewater to the surface where it was discharged into two preaeration channels and then into eight sedimentation tanks each approximately 100 ft wide by 240 ft long with an average water depth of a little over 11 ft. Sludge off the bottom of the tanks was pumped to gravity thickeners, grease and scum off the top was collected and pumped to concentration tanks. The remaining effluent was chlorinated and then discharged into the harbor. Thickened sludge and concentrated scum were sent to three heated anaerobic (without oxygen) digesters. In them bacteria decomposed and broke down the organic waste reducing its volume and yielding methane gas. The resulting sludge was pumped into a fourth tank where it was discharged from into the harbor during an outgoing tide by mixing it with the chlorinated effluent flow. The gas generated in the digesters could be used to power the pumps. |
| While there are had been some initial problems with the plant, roofs to the digester tanks had to be replaced after only a few months of operations, by early 1969 the MDC could claim progress was being made in cleaning up Boston Harbor. It was announced that three Winthrop beaches were now declared safe for use, and a shell-fish area near Logan airport was also opened. Unfortunately, the optimism expressed by the MDC would not be borne out. |
| Deer Island had proven a difficult location to build the initial sewage facility at the beginning of the 1900s. Logistics of getting materials to an island was a problem as was constructing the outfall extending into the harbor. For engineers designing a large sewage treatment plant in the 1950s the problem was the limited amount of space available on the island to build the plant. Large sedimentation tanks, sludge digesters, and scum thickeners all had to fit. In addition, the building needed to fit the nine large pumps and related equipment would also be large. |
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| With the availability of methane gas (aka biogas) at no cost from the anaerobic sludge digesters, the logical choice for driving the pumps were dual-fuel diesel engines that could run on either diesel fuel or the biogas. For industrial applications these were massive pieces of equipment. Taking up more room was the gearing needed to transfer the power of horizontal crankshaft of the typical diesel engines to vertical shafts that spun the pumps. Nine of the massive engines and their transfers were needed and there was just not enough space available on the island. Fortunately for engineers in the 1950s there was another option. |
| With the availability of biogas at no cost from the anaerobic sludge digesters, the logical choice for driving the pumps were dual-fuel diesel engines that could run on either diesel fuel or the biogas. For industrial applications, these were massive pieces of equipment. Taking up more room was the gearing needed to transfer the power of horizontal crankshaft of the typical diesel engines to vertical shafts that spun the pumps. Nine of the massive engines and their transfers were needed and there was just not enough space available on the island. Fortunately for engineers in the 1950s there was another option. |
| The Nordberg Manufacturing Company of Milwaukee, Wis. had been making large industrial engines and other equipment since the 1890s. Nordberg steam, then diesel engines had been used in mines, power plants, and ships, including Liberty ships during World War II. In the 1950s the company had come up with a new design for a powerful and compact dual-fuel diesel engine. No other company made anything like it. The cylinders of engine were arranged in a flat horizontal radial configuration rather than the traditional inline vertical arrangement. The engines took only about the half the floor space of engines with the same power. In addition, the crankshaft extended vertically from the engine allowing for a direct connection to the driveshaft of the pump eliminating the need for transfer gears. |
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| In 1960 there had been complaints that MDC engineers had chosen a design for the DITP’s power station where only one manufacturer’s engines could be used. That was the case. No company other than Nordberg made a similar radial diesel engine. The selection of such an innovative design for engines might have seen risky, but for the engineers the selection appeared sound. The engines were already in regular use. By the mid-1950s the aluminum company Alcoa had installed 220 similar Nordberg radial engines in seven buildings at its Point Comfort Works plant in Texas. The Kaiser Aluminum plant in Chalmette, La. had 80 of them. Smelting aluminum requires huge amounts of electricity. Both plants used the abundant quantity of natural gas produced in their areas to power their many Nordberg engines to general the electricity needed. |
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Unfortunately for the MDC the selection of the Nordberg radial engines would prove to be problematic. One of the first signs of a problem appears in the MDC’s Commissioners minutes for May 1968, just at the time when the plant was beginning operations. One of the nine Nordberg engines had failed and the MDC was looking to the company for repairs. For the aluminum shelters, with their banks of Nordberg engines providing a buffer, losing an engine, or taking one offline for maintenance, was an acceptable part of operations. Enough electricity could still be generated. For Deer Island there was no buffer if the anticipated maximum flow of 848 mgd during a storm was reached. Each of the nine 2,125 horsepower Nordberg engines drove pumps each with a capacity of 90 mgd. The maximum flow rate was seldom reached, but also seldom did the DITP have all nine Nordberg engines running. |
| The degree to which the MDC was having problems with the Nordberg engines became apparent with the publishing of the multi-volume, Wastewater Engineering and Management Plan for Boston Harbor, Eastern Massachusetts Metropolitan Area (EMMA) study in the fall of 1975. Prompted by federal officials in 1971 the study was to make projections out as far as 2050 for what would be needed to provide adequate sewage treatment for the metropolitan area. An appendix in Vol. No. 10 looked at the operation of equipment DITP. A consulting engineer had visited the plant in the summer of 1973 and his report painted a less than encouraging picture of the Nordberg engines. He notes that while the pumping equipment was relatively new, |
| “This is a sad state of affairs. The pumping installation must be rated a failure from the standpoint of reliability. With only five engines available for service, the station is incapable of pumping the maximum hourly flow under either design or actually experienced conditions.” |
| Complicating efforts to maintain the engines was difficulty acquiring replacement parts. Nordberg had been purchased by Rexnord, who in 1974, stopped making the engines. Parts had to be sourced from another company, and lead times were long. When Alcoa was contacted regarding their experience with the engines, it was discovered that their policy on the engine’s crankshafts was to wait until they broke and then replace them since it costs practically as much just to inspect them. |
| MDC’s Commissioners minutes from January of 1976 disclose another problem with Nordberg engines, though one that was clearly known to the residents of Winthrop. Saltwater entering the sewage system at faulty tide gates was a common problem. Excess salt in the wastewater reduced the effectiveness of the anaerobic process in the digesters to produce biogas. That meant the Nordberg engines had to run more frequently on diesel fuel rather cleaner burning biogas the digesters produced. This coupled with a common of leaky piston rings in the cylinders would lead to a buildup of oil and carbon in the smokestacks of the plant. They would regularly catch fire leading to numerous calls to the Winthrop Fire Department. No efforts were initially made by the plant to stop the fires for fear that the flames might travel down the smokestacks into the plant. Finally, in 1976 the MDC awarded a contract to install a carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system. The saltwater intrusion also led to excess wear on the pump impeller blades requiring added maintenance, cost, and downtime. |
| The MDC and Massachusetts officials knew that just getting the DITP operational would not be enough to clean up the harbor. Their hope was that with two sewage treatment plant now operating they could turn their attention, and focus their limited resources, to the combined sewage outlets and tide gates numbering in the hundreds that needed repair. Their argument was that with the two treatment plants functioning the quality of the water in the harbor had improved significantly and there would be no need for additional treatment until 2020. This was based on a report that had commissioned with the caveat that a better method for disposing of the sludge other than dumping into the harbor would be implemented. There would be no new method, and very soon there would be problems with both sewage treatment plants. |
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| Sewage treatment plants are sophisticated industrial operations using equipment that needs to keep running efficiently and that requires regular preventive maintenance backed up by a full inventory of spare parts. They also require a full staff of trained and motivated workers supported by top management. The managers of the MDC, many who owed their positions to political patronage, were often more interested in answering to requests from state legislators for parks, swimming pools, or skating rinks for their constituents than they were for money for unseen sewage infrastructure. |
| Tour of the Deer Island Treatment Plant in 1982 |
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| In January of 1976 the inadequate funding and lack of maintenance caught up with the nearly 25-year-old Nut Island Treatment Plant. All four of the plant’s diesel-powered electrical generators failed. Before they were fixed, for four days millions of gallons of untreated sewage were discharged into the harbor. A Boston Globe story in 1982, Raw sewage often flows into Boston Harbor, listed twenty different times in that year alone when problems at the plant resulted in over two billion gallons of raw or partially treated sewage getting discharged in the harbor. Years after the facility was decommissioned and area turned into a park, Paul F. Levy the former MWRA director coined the expression, “Nut Island Effect" in an article in the Harvard Business Review, When Good Teams Go Wrong. In it Levy describe an organizational behavior phenomenon in which a team of skilled employees becomes isolated from distracted top managers resulting in a catastrophic loss of the ability of the team to perform their mission effectively. |
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The DITP would have its share of breakdowns. The large radial engines were most reliable when they ran at a constant speed against a constant load, just as they were used at the power plants on the gulf. In April of 1981 six of the plant’s Nordberg engines failed leaving only two working. When this happened sewage backed up into the tunnels under Boston Harbor feeding the plant. To prevent sewage from backing up into people’s homes, the pumping station at Calf Pasture was activated pumping millions of gallons of raw sewage out from the Moon Island emergency outlet into the harbor. On Mother’s Day of 1983 a coupling on one of the pumps at the plant split due to lack of maintenance. Because there was no backup, raw sewage spilled onto the plant’s floor eventually filling up two floors burying the cause of the problem. It would take three days for MDC police divers to grope through the mess to identify and repair the problem. In the meantime, 153 million gallons of a raw sewage was discharged into the harbor. |
| The beginning of operations at the Deer Island Treatment Plant lead to a short period of improvement in conditions in the harbor unfortunately followed by an extended skid towards major environmental degradation. |
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